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Some residents of Tandale Ward, in the city of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
have made significant investments in their homes to respond to weather 
events exacerbated by climatic change. Like other low-income areas in the 
city (see Kiunsi 2013), Tandale is in a very low-lying area and is vulner-
able to flooding. As a result, many households have built secondary walls 
around the base of their houses to prevent water and associated debris from 
entering their homes when flooding occurs. Figure 11.1 shows a wall built 
around the base of a home in Tandale, and Figure 11.2 shows the proxim-
ity of houses to a river that is prone to flooding during extreme rain events.
While some might suggest that the actions of Tandale residents illustrate 
grassroots climate adaptation, a more accurate description for these activi-
ties is ‘coping’. Far from semantics, the distinction between ‘coping’ and 
‘adaptation’ is important when thinking about a long-term and institution-
alized response to climate change in cities (Bulkeley & Tufts 2013). Cop-
ing mechanisms represent any actions that respond to potential disaster or 
impending shocks; adaptation refers to the deliberate, intended and pur-
poseful actions of governments and formal institutions to respond to climate 
risks and vulnerabilities—the kind of action that is thought necessary for 
resilience (see Bulkeley & Tufts 2013; Pelling 2011). Thus, when discussing 
climate change adaptation or mitigation, formal international, national and 
local institutions and organizations must be considered: the formal entities 
that can leverage financial resources to invest in climate adaptation and mit-
igation measures; that can engage with citizens that are coping with risks to 
best respond to their needs; and that, in theory, have tools and mechanisms 
to support (and enforce) actions to improve resilience.
International reports on climate change impacts and adaptation are 
replete with statements emphasizing the role that local and urban govern-
ments should play in successful adaptation and the need for vertical and 
horizontal coordination and collaboration between governments, civil 
society and the private sector (see section 8.4, IPCC WG II, 2014). The 
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2014 IPCC Working Group II report on impacts, adaptation and vulner-
ability states that there is evidence that ‘well-governed cities have a strong 
basis for building climate resilience’ (IPCC 2014, 4; 49). The emphasis on 
the role of local governments and multilevel governance is long standing 
and important. Naturally, however, these prescriptions under-emphasize 
Figure 11.1 Home with secondary wall, Tandale Ward, Dar es Salaam.
Photo by Christopher Gore.
Figure 11.2 River in Tandale Ward, with houses near river.
Photo by Christopher Gore.
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the stark, historic and present challenges that local governments in poor 
countries confront in leveraging resources to respond to climate risks, and 
in working with citizens and national governments in ways necessary to 
produce resiliency. Most critically, these observations under-emphasize the 
political sensitivity of climate adaptation strategies (see Bulkeley & Tufts 
2013); “addressing climate change in the city provokes fundamental politi-
cal tensions over how and for whom environmental protection . . . should 
be pursued” (Bulkeley 2010, 15). Resiliency depends on “effective politi-
cal organization and receptive political systems with the capacity both to 
respond positively to citizen demands and to learn” and “. . . the quality of 
governance, especially local governance” (Satterthwaite 2013, 388). Yet cit-
ies in sub-Saharan Africa1, are known for limited financial resources, tense 
relations with national governments, and inadequate services and support 
for citizens. Hence, to reflect and theorize on cities and climate change in 
Africa means to undertake a deeply political exercise; what is needed for 
resiliency is daunting for many reasons explained below, but most funda-
mentally, requires an ambitious agenda that is likely to generate conflict.
With respect to financial resources, for example, in many countries, 
annual city expenditures per person are extremely low. A study of ten Afri-
can cities between 2007 and 2009 showed that when Johannesburg was 
excluded, the average expenditure per person was U.S. $32.93 (Stren 2014, 
24). Adding to this lack of resources is an historic tension between urban 
and national governments and a general lack of national-urban coopera-
tion to respond to the rapid population changes in African cities and the 
associated infrastructural and housing shortages (Gore & Muwanga 2013; 
Goodfellow & Titeca 2012; Resnick 2011). Thus, for resource poor and 
underserviced cities in Africa, the space between what experts and the inter-
national community say is needed to produce resiliency and the reality of 
urban conditions, management and governance is wide. This observation is 
not intended to underestimate the importance of African cities’ engagement 
in climate knowledge networks, international conferences and debates, or 
their own knowledge of the challenges they confront. Research on cities 
and climate change clearly acknowledges that the diffusion of informa-
tion and ideas through transnational networks are important in prompt-
ing city initiatives (Carmin, Anguelovski & Roberts 2012; Schreurs 2008; 
Bulkeley & Betsill 2005). But in recognizing the international engagement 
of African urban leaders, it is imperative to recognize the importance of 
endogenous factors as motivators for city climate response and how domes-
tic governance—the character of the relationship between city governments 
and citizens and city governments and national governments—has an indel-
ible impact on a city’s capacity to respond to the climate risks it confronts. 
One of the best examples of the importance of endogenous leadership in 
Africa comes from the city of Durban, where climate leadership came from 
within the city (Carmin, Anguelovski & Roberts 2012). Outside Africa, 
research has shown how the internal institutional structure of cities affects 
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climate activities (Burch 2010a; 2010b; Dannevig, Hovelsrud, & Husabø 
2013; Meijerink & Stiller 2013). Thus, this chapter argues that to under-
stand how African cities are responding and may respond to climate change, 
how they engage in national and international processes, and their prospects 
for responding to the global climate challenge, there is a need to get ‘back 
to basics’: there is a need to understand how and why city governments are 
structured and function the way they are; how these characteristics shape 
response to urban challenges generally and climate risks specifically; and the 
implications of altering these structures and functions. The chapter argues 
that a central goal of future research on African cities and climate change 
must be to understand how the structure of city governments in Africa and 
the character of their relationship with citizens, other governments and the 
international community—the character of governance—will affect future 
climate adaptation and resiliency.
The chapter continues by first discussing some central challenges in Afri-
can cities today, particularly in relation to their rapid change. The relation-
ship between these changes and general expected effects of climate change 
are also highlighted. Then, two examples of cities in East Africa are pre-
sented and contrasted: Kampala, Uganda, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
The cases have similar general challenges with respect to urban management 
and climate change, but the structure of each city government is very dif-
ferent, and each city’s relations with its citizens and the national govern-
ment are also very different. Thus, while both cities are engaged in activities 
responsive to climate risks, the structure of government and character of 
governance in each city has historically and is presently going to produce 
significant challenges in establishing long-term institutionalized and sus-
tained climate adaptation. The chapter concludes by making some observa-
tions about the future of African cities in climate action and governance in 
light of the emphasis on the structure and function of city governments.
Following in the spirit of the central questions this book takes up, the 
chapter reveals that African cities are engaged formally in local, national 
and global climate processes, and they are learning how to engage with 
international networks and communities in seeking both resources and 
support, and to advocate for action. As a result, the prospect of crafting 
responses to the global climate challenge and local climate risks is high. The 
challenge that remains is whether the current political context of African 
cities and structure of city governments can adapt in a manner and pace that 
is deemed necessary to respond to climate risks. For theory, the implications 
are significant and raise questions about the conditions when international 
learning and knowledge generation can or do translate into political and 
policy change domestically. Equally, if the change can take place, what con-
cerns and implications of that change will arise, particularly for the popula-
tions most vulnerable. This chapter argues that there is a significant need 
to return to ‘first principles’ when considering city climate governance and 
theory in Africa: the structure of city governments, their relationship with 
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national governments, and their capacity to implement climate resilient 
actions will depend on a national enabling environment that is fiscally and 
politically supportive of city climate leadership and action.
AFRICAN CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EFFECT  
OF GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE
For several important reasons, African cities are anomalous globally. Com-
pared to other regions of the world, the national percentage of African 
urban populations is lower than any other region. According to the UN 
Population Division, approximately 36.7 percent of Africans live in urban 
areas (UN Population Division 2012). This comparatively low total popula-
tion of urban residents, however, is changing rapidly. Compared to other 
regions of the world, the average annual rate of urban growth is one of the 
highest in the world: from 2005 to 2010 average annual urban growth was 
estimated to be 3.71 percent, which was higher than China, Latin America, 
Europe and North America (Stren 2014, S20). While migration to cities 
contributes to population increase it is the not the dominant reason city 
populations are growing rapidly (see Potts 2009). The most dominant con-
tributor to population growth is due to natural increase.
One dominant concern amongst African urban scholars is the glob-
ally and historically unprecedented disconnect between urban population 
growth and economic growth in many African countries. Population growth 
is not consistent with economic growth in African cities, leading some inter-
national agencies to argue that “the wisdom of seeking economic survival in 
the largest cities has become doubtful” (UN-Habitat 2008, 106). Given this 
context, it is not surprising to learn that service delivery and housing have 
not met need and demand. While the total African urban population living 
in informal settlements or ‘slums’ is expected to decrease over time, by 2030 
still over 50 percent of urban residents are expected to be living in areas that 
are un- or under-serviced, that lack secure tenure or property rights, that are 
dominated by unregulated structures, and where formal physical planning 
is difficult to implement (Stren 2014, S22).
The challenge of urban development and management in the majority 
of large, medium and small African cities is ongoing and will persist for 
the medium to long term. Given this, for the foreseeable future African city 
governments will remain deeply dependent on national financing and col-
laboration, along with international financing, to respond to basic service 
needs as well as climate-specific needs. Improvements in infrastructure and 
housing for climate resiliency, for example, will depend on leveraging finan-
cial resources. Yet, national governments in many countries have been very 
slow to react to rapid urban change and there exists deep acrimony between 
many African city governments and national governments historically and 
today (see Resnick 2011; Esser 2012; Gore & Muwanga 2013). This has left 
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an indelible impact on the quality of service delivery and urban governance 
generally. When the complexity of climate change is added into this mix, the 
conclusion is not positive: “The multi-dimensional complexities of urban 
form, urbanization and urban governance in Africa have left city authori-
ties and governments unprepared for climate change” (Lwasa 2010b, 20). 
The recent IPCC, Working Group II, report Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, Vulnerability provides detailed information on why the link 
between climate and urbanization in Africa warrants significant attention.
For the continent as a whole, the IPCC reports general impacts that are 
alarming: general warming across the continent; likely reductions in pre-
cipitation in North and southwest Africa, while producing general water 
stress throughout the continent; increases in intensity of rainfall events, 
with a corresponding negative impact on crop production due to increas-
ing temperatures and changes in precipitation. One of the most challenging 
climate change impacts in Africa, as well as globally, is that climate change 
is expected to exacerbate vulnerability, particularly by increasing the burden 
or multiplying existing health vulnerabilities, such as safe water, sanitation, 
and food insecurity.
For urban areas in Africa specifically, the IPCC report highlights the vul-
nerability of populations living in coastal areas that may be displaced due to 
storm events and sea level rise. Heavy rain events and poor urban infrastruc-
ture have and will continue to produce concerns about flooding and general 
infrastructure damage, particularly the households of poor and vulnerable 
populations. The report also notes that these vulnerabilities will be accentu-
ated by the low adaptive capacity of local governments:
Weak local government creates and exacerbates problems including 
the lack of appropriate regulatory structures and mandates; poor or 
no planning; lack of or poor data; lack of disaster risk reduction strate-
gies; poor servicing and infrastructure (particularly waste management 
and drainage); uncontrolled settlement of high-risk areas such as flood-
plains, wetlands, and coastlines; ecosystem degradation; competing 
development priorities and timelines; and a lack of coordination among 
government agencies. (IPCC WG II, 2014, Chapter 22, 28)
Owing to this long list of concerns, in the last decade or more, multilateral, 
bilateral and international non-government organizations have invested 
heavily in risk assessments and planning for adaptation to climate change in 
the sub-continent. But while financing for climate adaptation projects exist, 
the success and effect of these initiatives cannot be considered in the absence 
of understanding how the very authorities and institutions on the front line 
of climate response do function and may function to address risks; that is, 
the structure and capacity of city governments and their relations with citi-
zens and governments will have a significant bearing on the potential to pro-
duce effective climate governance nationally and at the city level. How cities 
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function, what national governments are doing to support or undermine 
city policy, and how city and national governments engage with citizens will 
have a bearing on future climate resiliency (Satterthwaite 2013).
Two cases of cities in East Africa are now presented to highlight the rela-
tionship between the structure of urban government (the formal administra-
tive structure inclusive of elected office holders and the bureaucracy), the 
character of urban governance (the character or relations between govern-
ments and non-government entities), and climate response. Two cases are 
presented rather than one longer case in order to contrast how the structure 
of government in two African cities has an immediate, direct and potentially 
different effect on urban policy and engagement with national governments 
and citizens—conditions deemed necessary for future climate resiliency. The 
case of Kampala, Uganda, is first presented, followed by Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania. General information about the cities is presented first, followed 
by a brief review of climate-specific issues affecting the cities. This climate 
context is followed by an explanation of the political and administrative 
structure of the cities and how this has historically effected policy action and 
what it suggests for future climate action.
KAMPALA, UGANDA
The city of Kampala is the capital of the East African country of Uganda. 
It is a relatively small country of about 236,000 square kilometers, on 
the northern shore of Lake Victoria, bordering South Sudan to the north, 
Kenya to the east, Tanzania and Rwanda to the southwest, Rwanda and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west. Despite its small geo-
graphic size, it has one of the fastest-growing populations in the world, 
at near 5 percent per year (Lambright 2014).In 2002, the national census 
revealed that the population was 23 million. In late August 2014, the latest 
national census took place. As of October 2014, the results of the census 
were still being compiled. In 2012, the UN Population Division estimated 
that the national population would be near 40 million, and by 2025 near 
55 million people (UN Population Division 2012). In 2002, Kampala 
had an estimated population of about 1.2 million; by 2011 the Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics projected the population to be 1.7 million (Kasaija & 
Lwasa 2014). Depending on how you define ‘Kampala’ and with whom 
you are speaking, the daytime population of the city and its environs may 
increase to 2.5 or 3 million people. The population changes in Uganda gen-
erally and Kampala specifically will be exacerbated in future by the very 
low national urban population—approximately 15 percent of the total 
population—and the very young population, thereby creating a scenario 
where natural increase is a central driver of population change. The speed of 
population change, combined with problems with urban management and 
service delivery (discussed more below), has left the city with large deficits 
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in housing, infrastructure and general service delivery. In addition, there is a 
historical and colonial legacy of water, waste collection and sewerage serv-
ing high-income areas of the city leaving low-income areas under-serviced 
and vulnerable (Gore & Gopakumar, forthcoming). This service deficit is 
amplified by the physical location of low-income settlements in Kampala. 
The formal city of Kampala surrounds several large hills, with correspond-
ing valleys in between. Generally, as is common in East Africa, low-income 
residential areas dominate low-lying areas. Not surprisingly, these areas are 
more vulnerable to flooding and heavy rainfall events, which themselves are 
expected to increase and intensify under future climate change.
The most serious and often quoted climate change impacts on Kampala 
relate to rainfall and flooding (see Lwasa 2010a). Lwasa (2010a) reports 
that over the last twenty years, the frequency of flooding events in Kampala 
due to more intense rainfall has increased. Conversely, there is also a con-
cern that under climatic change sources of drinking water could decrease, 
which could compromise water supply, or at minimum require new invest-
ments in infrastructure to access new water sources. Flooding and high vol-
umes of runoff produce other environmental and health stresses, including 
destruction of homes and potential for exposure to waterborne diseases, 
such as malaria, dysentery and cholera, which result from stagnant water 
and untreated sewage. High levels of poverty in the city make these con-
ditions worse. While Kampala generated 42 percent of national economic 
growth between 2005–2009, and poverty in rural areas decreased during 
this time, inequality nationally, and poverty in Kampala, increased during 
this period (World Bank 2013, 29). Kampala’s estimated poverty level was 
about 30 percent of the population in 2010 (Lwasa 2010a, 167).
In light of these challenges and climatic conditions, it has been argued 
that “Kampala city requires restructuring of spatial planning and urban gov-
ernance systems by making plans responsive to current and future [climate] 
challenges” (Lwasa 2010a, 168). In late 2010, a new ‘governance system’ 
did arise in Kampala. But the reason for this change was not climate-related 
(as would be expected). Change came as a result of a long history of conflict 
and tension between the national and city government, and the Kingdom of 
Buganda (see Goodfellow & Lindemann 2013), which owns approximately 
half of the land in Kampala city proper. The question that is most relevant 
when thinking about the city and climate change is whether the changes in 
the structure of urban government and the character of governance align 
with characteristics deemed necessary for urban climate resilience.
Until late 2010, Kampala had been governed like most cities, with a pop-
ularly elected mayor and council responsible for policy and program imple-
mentation. Like many cities in Africa, there had been a tendency, however, 
for a majority of Kampala elected officials, including mayors, to represent 
political parties in opposition to the President’s (see Resnick 2011; Esser 
2012). Adding to this, cases of corruption and poor service delivery in the 
city were common, and overall, despite some very positive environmental 
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initiatives relating to urban food production and security (see Cole et al. 
2008), the city was largely seen as being ineffectual. The national govern-
ment, however, did not help to minimize this image. Despite the size of the 
city relative to any other urban area in the country, its dominance or pri-
macy in terms of economic contributions to national wealth, and the chal-
lenges it encountered in responding to rapid urban change, it was funded in 
the same manner as any other district in the country (see Gore & Muwanga 
2013). In addition, urban areas and Kampala specifically, had never been 
prioritized or generally referenced in national poverty or development strat-
egies (Mitlin 2004; Gore 2008); there was no national urban policy; and 
the dramatic urban change that was befalling the country was not well 
recognized by national leadership until almost 2010 (Gore & Muwanga 
2013, 3). Thus, infrastructure and service quality in the city prior to the 
national government’s takeover was poor and generally deteriorating, mak-
ing it somewhat easy to convince the public that a national takeover of the 
city was in the best interest of citizens and the country. Indeed, just after 
the formal takeover of the city, national and local candidates aligned with 
the President’s political party, the National Resistance Party, and President 
Yoweri Museveni himself, received more support from Kampala voters than 
ever previously.
Thus, in late 2010, the national government passed the Kampala Capital 
City Bill, which transferred authority for the city directly to the national 
government.
The new bill produced a dramatic change in the structure of capital city 
government and urban governance, vesting authority for planning and 
development decisions in an Executive Director and ten Directors. While 
popular local elections remain in place, the popularly elected mayor and 
council have no direct authority over spending, therefore lacking “. . . fiscal 
autonomy—a de facto unfunded mandate” (Gore & Muwanga 2013, 12). 
The Executive Director is appointed by the President and accountable to 
Cabinet and a Minister responsible for Kampala. The Kampala Capital City 
Authority (KCCA) has replaced the former city council. The KCCA consists 
of elected councillors but the Directors of various city departments, such as 
Physical Planning and Physical Services and the Environment, take direc-
tion from the Executive Director and not the KCCA. As a result, while the 
elected councillors make recommendations for city programs, the Directors 
are ultimately accountable to the Executive Director and not to individuals 
popularly elected.
In 2014, Kampala City is a much different organization than previously. 
Annual reports to Parliament take stock of activities and expenditures, 
along with future initiatives. A majority of technical city staff has changed, 
with bureaucratic leaders clearly aligned with the mandates set out by the 
Executive Director. Further, while there have been many controversies relat-
ing to city government policy decisions, such as relating to petty street trad-
ers and illegal buildings, the general sentiment in the city is that roads and 
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infrastructure have improved and self-monitoring by the city suggests that 
waste collection has increased; revenue generation has increased; social 
development activities are documented, such as support for urban farmers; 
and enforcement of laws has increased (Government of Uganda 2014).
With respect to climate change specifically, the Executive Director, Ms. Jen-
nifer Musisi, has also spoken openly and directly about taking actions to 
respond to climate change. At the 2014 Technical Experts Meeting on the 
Urban Environment in Bonn, Germany, Musisi announced several initiatives 
she connected to climate change and improved resiliency: solar-powered 
street lighting along all new road lighting systems in the city; construction of 
new channels to minimize flooding in city suburbs; new electricity genera-
tion using solid waste from the municipal landfill site; and the promotion of 
new stoves to reduce charcoal and wood consumption and reduce particu-
late matter in the city. These announcements, including the Executive Direc-
tor’s direct participation in an international meeting and networking with 
organizations like the Global Environment Facility and UN-Habitat, clearly 
reveal that climate change and financing for climate resiliency are priorities. 
But do these actions suggest a positive path for climate resiliency?
One of the critical needs for low-income cities is support and collabora-
tion with national governments and international institutions. Previously, 
the relationship between Kampala and the national government was poor 
and the city had a poor record of performance, which together had a nega-
tive indirect effect on the capacity for the city to attract international finance 
and support. Hence, from a positive perspective, the city seems engaged in 
a multilevel process of upward vertical collaboration with the national gov-
ernment and international actors. Horizontal collaboration, networking and 
knowledge sharing at international events are also evident, which, as earlier 
noted, is always important in city climate action. One large uncertainty that 
remains, however, is how and if the city will and can build bridges with 
citizens and civil society organizations and begin to establish and reinvigo-
rate the conditions necessary for urban climate governance that responds to 
citizen needs and distributes action and benefits equitably. Acknowledging 
the improvements to the city since the KCCA came into being, we note that 
one of the biggest challenges in Kampala will be how to move beyond a 
piecemeal approach to city development and begin to work with the many 
civil society organizations engaged in such things as housing, flood response 
and slum upgrading as real partners (Kasaiji and Lwasa 2014). Further, it 
remains that the technical arm of the city must overcome deeply rooted pub-
lic suspicion and concern that the takeover of the city was as much a politi-
cal maneuver of the President to undermine opposition as it was a decision 
deemed necessary to respond to the failures of city governance and service 
improvement (see Lambright 2014). Indeed, whether one of the outcomes 
of the new structure of city government produces more programs to address 
climate risks, these cannot be equated with a city that is climate adaptive or 
resilient. The national government’s takeover of the city was deeply political 
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and built on a history of conflict between citizens and levels of govern-
ment. It will take time before the actions of the new city government will 
be able to show that environmental and climate policies and programs are 
sensitive to the city as a whole, and not reasserting political tensions or 
conflicts that hold a lasting legacy in the city. So while the new city govern-
ment of Kampala does seem to be moving in a direction that is illustrative 
of a city with the resources and relations needed for climate adaptation, 
climate resilience will remain dependent on how the new structure of the 
city government engages in the social and political task with its citizens and 
civil society organizations that are necessary for future resilience. Further, 
both pragmatically and theoretically, if the national government’s takeover 
of the city does produce positive outcomes for climate resiliency, then very 
careful and challenging debates will need to unfold about whether the risks 
of climate are urgent enough in some cities to accept or endorse a limit on 
local democracy and the influence of popularly elected councillors on proj-
ects and funding in the city. It is important to remember that many of the 
most popular and beautifully planned cities in the world, like Paris, or cities 
deemed ‘successful’ in the developing world, like Curitiba, Brazil, owe their 
‘success’ to national leaders that took power undemocratically and had a 
vision for city development that was facilitated by their power. Is climate 
resiliency in poor urban environments worthy of these national interven-
tions? Clearly authoritarian interventions are not necessary for city climate 
adaptation; but for future research, it is incumbent to try to understand the 
conditions (political, social and administrative) that lead to positive initia-
tives, such as in Durban, South Africa, where endogenous leadership was 
critical (see Carmin, Anguelovski & Roberts 2012).
Turning to a different example, the city of Dar es Salaam similarly shows 
evidence of engagement with climate issues internationally, but here the 
fragmented model of city government produces different concerns about 
the capacity of the city-region to produce climate actions that will produce 
resiliency.
DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, is an historic port city on the east coast of Africa. 
Tanzania, bordered by Kenya to the north, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda to 
the northwest, Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, and Zambia, 
Malawi, and Mozambique to the south, is about 945,000 square kilome-
ters, over three times the geographic size of Uganda. The population of 
Tanzania, like Uganda, is also increasing very rapidly. According to the 
United Nations Population Division (2012), in 2005, the national popula-
tion was estimated at almost 38.8 million people. By 2010, the population 
had increased to 45 million. By 2015, it is estimated that the population will 
reach 52 million, and by 2025 almost 70 million.
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Dar es Salaam is the dominant, primate city in Tanzania, but functions 
with a fragmented government structure. When people discuss the city of 
Dar es Salaam, they are actually referring to the formal Region of Dar es 
Salaam—a national region. This region is made up of three national dis-
tricts, which are also three independent municipalities—Illala, Kinondoni 
and Temeke. Each of these municipalities has an independent mayor and 
council. The city/region as a whole is overseen by a nationally appointed 
Regional Commissioner, but there also exists a Dar es Salaam City Council 
and Mayor of Dar es Salaam. The Dar es Salaam City Council is supposed 
to help coordinate activities for the city/region as a whole, although it has 
no legislative authority to do so. This administrative context is significant 
when thinking about climate action in the city and will be discussed further 
below.
While the political capital of Tanzania was formally moved from Dar es 
Salaam to Dodoma in 1973, and the National Assembly opened there in 
1996, many central government offices remain in Dar es Salaam, and the 
city remains the economic center of the country. Dar es Salaam generates 
over 70 percent of the national gross domestic product (UN-Habitat 2009, 
6). In 2011, Dar es Salaam’s population was estimated to be around 4 mil-
lion people, “which is approximately ten percent of the country’s total pop-
ulation and 50 percent of its urban population. With a population growth 
of 4.3 percent per year, Dar es Salaam has become the third fastest growing 
city in Africa and among the ten fastest growing cities in the world” (World 
Bank 2011). Not surprisingly, this speed of growth, combined with the size 
of the city, has produced serious challenges in service delivery.
Some of the most regularly cited environmental service provision chal-
lenges in Dar es Salaam are drinking water provision, housing and hous-
ing quality, and general infrastructure quality. The infrastructure for water 
provision dates back almost fifty years; the quality of the infrastructure has 
been so poor in the recent past that 60 percent of water pumped is lost; and 
it is estimated that only 30 percent of city residents have access to tap water 
(Kyessi 2005, 3). Financing service provision is also a major problem. A 
2004 report by ActionAid revealed that only 26 percent of people receiving 
water were being billed for it, and even those connected to the city’s water 
system regularly went weeks without water (Dill 2009, 614). Further, only 
about 10 percent of the population is connected to the sewer system (Kiunisi 
2013, 323). The health outcomes from these conditions are predictable: 
“cholera, dysentery and other gastrointestinal diseases are commonplace in 
Dar es Salaam” (Dill 2009, 614).
The number of people living in informal or unplanned settlements in Dar 
es Salaam is also very high, with the percentage of households categorized 
as ‘slum households’ ranging between 65–80 percent (UN-Habitat 2008; 
Kiunsi 2013). The physical quality of these dwellings combined with their 
location in low-lying areas, often near water courses, in valleys, or near 
coastal wetlands, means that they are very vulnerable to extreme weather 
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events such as heavy rainfall, which cause flooding, erosion and land deg-
radation. Conversely, in the past ten years, the city has also experienced 
drought and increases in mean temperatures, which are expected to con-
tinue (World Bank, n.d.). In short, climatic change is expected to exacer-
bate already difficult infrastructure and human welfare challenges: “Dar 
es Salaam is a city where urban poverty and climate variability—floods as 
well as drought—jointly create a situation of high vulnerability for the poor 
that affects crucial aspects of their lives, e.g., health, sanitation and access 
to clean water, and safety of housing and property” (START et al. 2011). 
More generally,
Tanzania is predicted to become warmer by 2.5° to 4.5°C by the year 
2080. . . . Precipitation is projected to increase in all rainfall seasons, 
with coastal and southern parts experiencing the greatest increases. Dar 
es Salaam has already become warmer—data from the TMA indicate 
an increase in both minimum and maximum temperatures over the last 
four to five decades. The data also show a decrease in the number of 
rainfall days and mean annual rainfall, and increased variability in rain-
fall intensity. (Kiunsi 2013, 325)
The costs of responding to these climatic challenges are enormous. The 
stormwater drains in Dar es Salaam were constructed in the 1950s and are 
deemed largely dysfunctional; the estimated cost of building a sea wall along 
the 100km coastline of Dar es Salaam to protect it from rising sea levels 
has been put at $270 billion; when the cost of upgrading housing is added 
to some of these projected costs and needs, then it is clear that costs of 
responding to climate risks are well beyond the national and local econo-
mies (Kithiia 2011, 177).
The real and expected effects of climate change on Dar es Salaam are 
well known. The city has been studied extensively, partly due to the many 
additional risks it confronts due to being on a coast as opposed to inland, 
like Kampala, and partly due to the speed of change it has experienced as an 
urban agglomeration. There are also many projects underway in the city to 
upgrade services, infrastructure, and housing, and to reduce congestion, such 
as the Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit (DART) system. Many other mitigation 
activities exist, such as: “. . . tree planting; the protection of coral reefs and 
mangrove vegetation; using more efficient cooking stoves; promoting the 
use of natural gas instead of oil and coal or using briquettes (to cut down 
on fuelwood/charcoal use); using energy-saving street lights; an improved 
public transport system; and methane gas capture at waste disposal sites” 
(Kiunsi 2013, 331). Funding for these activities and risk assessments have 
come from various international sources such as the European Union, the 
World Bank, UN-Habitat, Cities Alliance, and the International Council for 
Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). Many of these international fund-
ing initiatives will benefit Dar es Salaam directly, but, importantly, the funds 
218 Christopher Gore
generally move through national ministries, particularly the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office, which signs off on international project funding. Hence, Dar 
es Salaam is formally engaged in multilevel climate actions and clearly con-
nected to the international system through funding and knowledge sharing.
Linkages between Dar es Salaam and the international community and 
knowledge networks also come about through local representatives. As a 
reminder, the City of Dar es Salaam is formally governed through a frag-
mented administrative structure—three independent municipalities, each 
with a popularly elected council and mayor; a city mayor and council 
that aims to coordinate city activities and initiatives but without legisla-
tive authority to do so; and a nationally appointed Regional Commissioner. 
One of the outcomes of this structure is that there are situations where the 
mayor of Dar es Salaam will participate in international meetings, while 
the mayor of one of three Dar es Salaam municipalities will participate in 
a different meeting or network. For example, the World Mayors Council 
on Climate Change has two mayors from the Region of Dar es Salaam as 
members—the mayor of the Municipality of Kinondoni and Temeke. Mean-
while, the mayor of Dar es Salaam—the city as a whole—represented the 
city on the World Bank’s Mayor’s Task Force on Climate Change, Disaster 
Risk and the Urban Poor and has represented the city as a whole at the C40 
Cities Climate Leadership Group. Yet, the Dar es Salaam mayor has no 
authority to implement a city-wide agenda without the support of the three 
other mayors and therefore must rely on cooperation, coercion or financial 
incentives from that national government or international sources to pro-
duce city-wide actions. Thus, city political leaders are engaged in knowledge 
sharing and networking internationally. But this engagement does not mean 
that the character of the relations between the city, citizens and government 
and non-government entities—the character of multilevel or local climate 
governance—will produce the conditions necessary for climate adaptation 
and resiliency.
The structural complexity of Dar es Salaam has challenged and does 
challenge the capacity for city-wide actions that are deemed necessary to 
adapt to climate change successfully and to make climate adaptation insti-
tutionalized in city administration. Dar es Salaam City Council staff, for 
example, have no authority to implement physical planning standards for 
the city as a whole and have not been engaged in the development of a 
much anticipated Master Plan (Author’s observation, June 2014). Further, 
it is important to remember that the structure of the city highlighted here 
masks the other layers of authority and representation at lower levels in 
the city, such as the street-level elected committees (mtaa committees) and 
the divisions that make up districts. Hence, while the lowest levels of local 
authority may have long-held systems of engagement with citizens through 
a history of decentralization—a case similar in Uganda—and therefore the 
quality of relations at this scale may be strong, these connections cannot be 
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considered independent of the vertical relations and collaboration deemed 
necessary for climate resilience. Once again, a scenario arises where the very 
conditions deemed important for citizen engagement and democracy may 
also prove to be—and often do prove to be—impediments to the kind of 
city-wide, rapid, institutionalized response to climate change that is needed. 
The pragmatic steps needed to respond to climate adaptation and pro-
duce resiliency are deeply political (see Bulkelely & Tufts 2013): in Dar es 
Salaam, to move people away from low-lying areas and into new housing 
settlements or for the national government to restructure the city to provide 
more authority to the City Council would have significant political fallout. 
These challenges are amplified by a history of low national attention to 
urban issues, such as in Uganda. Cities and national urban centers have not 
received a lot of prominence in national development and climate strategies 
in the country—something similar in Uganda; the country’s 2007 National 
Adaptation Programme of Action, for example, emphasized rural and natu-
ral resource issues, with human settlements listed as the ninth of eleven 
priority sectors (Kiunsi 2013, 321–322).
Unlike Kampala, no large national intervention in the structure of gov-
ernment in Dar es Salaam has occurred to date. Local political and tech-
nical leaders from both cities are engaged in international climate forums 
and have received funding for risk assessments and improvements in phys-
ical infrastructure that are necessary in the face of climate risk. Further, 
as should be expected in poor urban settings, both cities depend on their 
national governments to facilitate international financial transfers and for 
the legislative authority to implement climate-responsive changes in their 
cities. While both cities are structured differently, the same questions linger 
about the effect of those structures on climate adaptation. While Kampala’s 
structure of government has changed and become more professionalized, 
having stronger technical capacity, and having the mandate of the Presi-
dent to implement changes and improvements, its success in fostering and 
building relations with Kampala citizens will be tested in the years to come 
owing to long-standing political conflict in the city. Conversely, while Dar es 
Salaam’s government structure, like Kampala’s old structure, is rooted in an 
ethos of democratic decentralization, it is now proving to be a point of clear 
debate, frustration and contention in urban management for the city—the 
structure that was created and lingers due to assumptions of better local 
representation produces extremely large challenges for city and region-wide 
coordination. In both cities, the central point that must be considered is the 
relationship between the structure of government, the character of gover-
nance and the effect of both of these on the capacity of the cities to respond 
to the looming challenge of climate change. How the structure of govern-
ment affects the ability, willingness and necessity of governments at multiple 
levels to engage with citizens will have a lasting impact on the capacity of 
cities to respond to climate change.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined two cities in East Africa that are both affected 
by and attempting to respond to quite significant challenges exacerbated by 
climatic change. In both cases, the cities are clearly planning for a future 
where the cities want to be part of an international community of cities 
engaged in climate activities. As other chapters in this book highlight, Dar 
es Salaam and Kampala, like other cities throughout Africa, are engaging 
with the international system through knowledge sharing, networking and 
financial opportunities. This is significant: African cities may be poor, lack 
capacity and are struggling with extraordinarily rapid change, but they are 
not disconnected from the debates taking place internationally and from the 
networks of cities that have materialized in the last two decades to respond 
to climate change. Given this, it is important to recognize the potential for 
African cities to play an important role in the future of international climate 
governance. African cities are not passive bystanders to the global climate 
challenge. While this observation is important in order to combat the main-
stream perception of African cities as being directionless and bastions of 
violence or poverty, a more important observation for international climate 
governance is whether and how the complexity of African urban govern-
ment and governance can and will impact pragmatic responses to climate 
change and theory of cities and climate change.
Pragmatically, projects and programs to respond to climate risks in Afri-
can cities must be cognizant of the history and power dynamics of city gov-
ernments and city politics. Climate risks may produce some isolated impacts 
in cities, but overall climate impacts will be at a regional and city-wide 
scale. For this reason, lack of attention to past political debates, conflicts 
and problems in cities, particularly national-local relations, and the effect 
of these relations on project implementation, has the potential to reproduce 
inequities in the city and to miss critical points of administrative leadership 
that may not be apparent from an organizational chart. Understanding why 
a government is structured the way it is, the past and present outcomes of 
that structure, and how to work within that structure to produce broad 
benefits in project implementation is essential for the institutionalization of 
climate adaptation.
Theoretically, the fact that African cities are engaged in international cli-
mate networks and domestic climate activities produces an exciting oppor-
tunity for future research and knowledge generation. It has only been in 
recent years that scholars globally have begun to examine the correlation 
between city structure and climate actions. This, however, will be a criti-
cal undertaking in the years to come. As the case of Durban, South Africa, 
revealed, internal bureaucratic leadership can produce significant city cli-
mate response (see Carmin, Anguelovski & Roberts 2012). Further, inter-
national research reveals that the structure of government seems to affect 
urban climate and environmental initiatives (Bae and Feoick 2013), as does 
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the relationships within government (Burch 2010a; 2010b). Given this, and 
recognizing one of the central questions in this book, there is a significant 
need to better understand how city governments are using climate change to 
justify policy development; the democratic and policy implications of doing 
this; and, whether cities are (re)asserting their political and policy impor-
tance nationally and internationally due to their front-line role in respond-
ing to climate change.
African cities are acting and want to act to respond to climate change. 
In supporting these actions and following their trajectory, it is imperative 
not to lose sight of the foundations of urban policy and response—the peo-
ple, structures and relations that are in theory, and increasingly in practice, 
vested with the moral if not legal authority to minimize climate vulnerability 
and to improve human welfare at the urban scale: the city government.
NOTE
 1. For the remainder of this chapter, ‘Africa’ will be used instead of ‘sub-Saharan 
Africa’. The author is conscious of the serious problems and potential per-
ils with generalizing for approximately 50 countries in the region and that 
the distinction between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa has disciplinary 
and historic rationales that do not always hold merit. For this reason, the 
chapter tries to be generalize minimally and to use specific examples where 
possible.
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